Most Competitive Mechanisms in Online Fair Division by Aleksandrov, Martin & Walsh, Toby
Most Competitive Mechanisms
in Online Fair Division
Martin Aleksandrov and Toby Walsh
UNSW Sydney and Data61, CSIRO and TU Berlin
{martin.aleksandrov,toby.walsh}@data61.csiro.au
Abstract. This paper combines two key ingredients for online algo-
rithms - competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice com-
plexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to improve online decisions)
- in the context of a simple online fair division model where items arrive
one by one and are allocated to agents via some mechanism. We consider
four such online mechanisms: the popular Ranking matching mechanism
adapted from online bipartite matching and the Like, Balanced Like
and Maximum Like allocation mechanisms firstly introduced for online
fair division problems. Our first contribution is that we perform a com-
petitive analysis of these mechanisms with respect to the expected size
of the matching, the utilitarian welfare, and the egalitarian welfare. We
also suppose that an oracle can give a number of advice bits to the mech-
anisms. Our second contribution is to give several impossibility results;
e.g. no mechanism can achieve the egalitarian outcome of the optimal
offline mechanism supposing they receive partial advice from the oracle.
Our third contribution is that we quantify the competitive performance
of these four mechanisms w.r.t. the number of oracle requests they can
make. We thus present a most competitive mechanism for each objective.
1 Introduction
Competitive analysis is a well-known technique to measure the quality of online
versus offline decisions [4,20]. Online decisions are irrevocable (i.e. we cannot
change past decisions) and instantaneous (i.e. we cannot use future knowledge).
Offline decisions are made supposing the entire problem information is available.
Competitive analysis has been applied in various areas during the years, e.g. on-
line bipartite matching, online stochastic matching, online sequential allocation,
online sequential bin packing, online scheduling [1,10,11,13,14].
For some online problems, quite successful algorithms are already known
under particular assumptions about the arriving input (e.g. [7]). For other prob-
lems, this is unfortunately not the case. For example, in the uniform knapsack
problem, any deterministic online algorithm without advice has an unbounded
competitive ratio. Interestingly, with just one bit of advice, it is possible to imple-
ment a 2-competitive algorithm for this problem [15]. In general, we can increase
the competitive ratio of any online algorithm by giving it enough advice. This
motivates the development of novel frameworks such as advice complexity.
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An online algorithm has now an access to an oracle tape for the problem of
interest and can request an advice string when making a decision. The oracle is
normally assumed to have an unlimited computational power but the number
of bits in the advice string must be polynomially bounded in the size of the
input offline problem. For a detailed survey on advice complexity, we refer to
[5]. Advice complexity is also related to semi-online and look-ahead algorithms
that suppose some of the input is available [19].
This raises a number of questions. How many advice bits are sufficient to
increase the competitive ratio of an online algorithm to a certain threshold? How
many bits are needed to match an optimal offline algorithm? For example, in the
popular paging problem, to achieve offline optimality with an online algorithm
we need dlog2 ke bits of advice to specify which page to delete from the buffer
of size k. This results in advice complexity of n · dlog2 ke for instances with n
requests, whereas it is shown that n + k bits of advice suffice [3,8]. As another
example, in online bipartite matching with a graph of size n (i.e. the number of
vertices in a partition), a corresponding deterministic online algorithm is optimal
(w.r.t. the expected matching size) whenever it has an access to dlog2 n!e but
not less advice bits [17].
Here, for the first time, we introduce techniques from competitive analysis
and advice complexity into online fair division. Online fair division is an impor-
tant and challenging problem facing society today due to the uncertainty we may
have about future resources, e.g. deceased organs to patients, donated food to
charities, electric vehicles to charging stations, tenants to houses, even students
to courses, etc. We often cannot wait until the end of the year, week or even
day before starting to allocate incoming resources. For example, organs cannot
be kept too long on ice or products cannot be stored in the warehouse before
distributing to a food bank [21,22]. We extend past work by asking how many
advice bits are needed to increase the welfare.
Advice helps us understand how the competitive ratio depends on uncertainty
about the future. It can be based on information about past or future items.
For example, consider the allocation of food donations to charities by a central
decision maker. A number of contractors usually donate food on a regular basis
and at specific times so the decision maker knows when some of the items will
arrive. Also, each item could have a type that is the set of charities that like the
item. The oracle might then keep track on the item types that have arrived in
the past and thus bias the allocation of the new item type whenever possible.
As another example, consider the allocation of deceased organs to patients. The
administrator of a hospital might know what organs will arrive that can be
exchanged with a neighboring hospital. They might use this offline information to
improve significantly the best local online match for the current organ. Further,
the oracle could keep track of how long patients are in the waiting list and
thus bias the future organ matching decisions based on this information under
various constraints, e.g. a patient should not wait for an organ more than 30
days, a patient who arrived at time moment 10 to the waiting list should receive
organs earlier than a patient who arrived after time moment 10, etc.
Our contributions: Our work is novel for several reasons. For example, we
combine advice complexity and competitive analysis in the context of online
fair division. As another example, we study multiple objectives and online com-
petitiveness of mechanisms. We first observe a 1-to-1 correspondence between
online bipartite matching and online fair division. By using this correspondence,
we can transfer and significantly extend objectives and algorithms from online
bipartite matching to online fair division and vice versa. This is useful for a
number of reasons. For example, agents in fair division have preferences and can
be strategic which is an aspect not typically considered in bipartite matching.
As a second example, allocations may be more difficult to find than matchings
if we want them to satisfy multiple fairness and efficiency criteria. We thus view
algorithms for online bipartite matching as mechanisms for online fair division.
Following this, we study the competitive performance of the popular matching
Ranking mechanism and the attractive Like, Balanced Like and Maxi-
mum Like allocation mechanisms w.r.t. three different objectives: the expected
matching size, the utilitarian welfare and the egalitarian welfare. We consider
three settings, namely online fair division setting without advice, with full advice
and with partial advice. In each of these settings, we analyse these four mecha-
nisms and present a most competitive mechanism for each objective supposing
adversarial input. We further plot their competitive ratios. We finally proved
that there is no mechanism that maximizes the expected matching size or the
egalitarian welfare and uses less than full advice.
The next Section 2 provides the notions, the mechanisms and the objectives
that we use throughout the paper. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we report our results
for the online setting without advice, the online setting with full advice and the
online setting with partial advice, respectively. Finally, we discuss related work,
future work and conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Online bipartite matching instance: An instance G has (1) a set of n “boy”
vertices, (2) a set of m “girl” vertices, (3) a weight matrix where the (i, j)-th cell
contains the weight of the edge between vertices the i-th “boy” vertex and the
j-th “girl” vertex, and (4) a sequence of the “girl” vertices. We consider binary
(i.e. unweighted graph) and non-negative (i.e. weighted graph) weights.
Online fair division instance: An instance I has (1) a set A of agents
a1, . . . , an, (2) a set O of indivisible items o1, . . . , om, (3) utility matrix U =
(uij)n×m where uij is the private utility of agent ai for item oj , and (4) ordering
o of the items. We consider binary and general non-negative rational utilities.
Online setting: Let GI = (A,O,U, o) be the online bipartite graph associ-
ated with I. We suppose that ordering o reveals item oj in round j when each
agent ai bids a rational non-negative value vij for item oj and a mechanism allo-
cates item oj to an agent. Further, we assume that the ordering o is adversarial
which captures the worst-case arrival sequences.
Fair division axioms: A mechanism is strategy-proof if, with complete in-
formation, no agent can misreport their utilities and thus increase their expected
outcome. Agent a1 envies (ex ante) ex post agent a2 if a1 assigns greater (ex-
pected) utility to the (expected) allocation of a2 than to their own (expected)
allocation. A mechanism is bounded envy-free (ex ante) ex post with r if no agent
envies (ex ante) ex post another one with more than r given the (expected)
allocation returned by the mechanism. A mechanism is (ex ante) ex post Pareto
efficient if its returned (expected) allocation is Pareto optimal.
Mechanisms: We use an oracle tape to specify some of the behavior of
the optimal offline mechanism. An online mechanism M does not consult the
oracle tape and makes the current decision supposing the past decisions are
irrevocable and no information about future items is available. By comparison,
its modification Adviced M can at each round decide whether to consult the
oracle or not. If “yes”, the oracle encodes the identifier of the agent that should
receive the item on the advice tape when the mechanism reads the tape and
allocates the item to the adviced agent. If “no”, AdvicedM runs M to allocate
the current item. There are two extreme cases. If Adviced M does not read the
oracle tape at any round, then its performance coincides with the one of M . If
AdvicedM reads the oracle tape at each round, then its performance coincides
with the one of an optimal offline mechanism.
We consider four online mechanisms. The Maximum Like mechanism allo-
cates each item oj uniformly at random to an agent with the greatest bid for
oj . The Ranking mechanism from [13] picks a strict priority ordering over the
agents uniformly at random and allocates each item oj to an agent that has
positive bid for it, has not been allocated items previously and has the greatest
priority. We further use the Like and Balanced Like mechanisms from [2].
The Like mechanism allocates each item oj uniformly at random to an agent
that bids positively for the item. The Balanced Like mechanism allocates each
item oj uniformly at random to an agent among those agents who bid positively
for the item and have been allocated fewest items previously. We modify these
four mechanisms to read advice bits from the oracle tape: Adviced Maximum
Like, Adviced Ranking, Adviced Like and Adviced Balanced Like.
These mechanisms satisfy many nice axioms. For example, Maximum Like
is Pareto efficient. In fact, it is one of a few Pareto efficient mechanisms but
unfortunately it is not strategy-proof or envy-free. Like is strategy-proof and
envy-free ex ante. In fact, each envy-free ex ante mechanism assigns probabilities
for items to agents as Like does. However, Like is not envy-free ex post. In
contrast, Balanced Like mechanism bounds the envy ex post. Interestingly,
with 0/1 utilities, it is also Pareto efficient and envy-free ex ante. We further
analysed the matching Ranking mechanism from a fair division point of view.
For example, it is strategy-proof, envy-free ex ante and bounds the envy ex post
but only with simple 0/1 utilities. However, it is not Pareto efficient in this
setting as it may discard items. These axiomatic properties are well-understood.
We, therefore, turn attention to the competitive properties of these mechanisms.
Objectives: Given instance I, each mechanism induces a probability distri-
bution over a set ΠI of allocations. The expected matching size k(I) is equal
to
∑
pi∈ΠI p(pi) · k(pi) where p(pi) is the probability of allocation pi and k(pi) is
the number of agents that are allocated items in pi. The expected utility ui(I) of
agent ai is
∑m
j=1 pi(j, I)·uij where pi(j, I) is the expected probability of agent ai
for item oj . The utilitarian welfare u(I) is equal to
∑n
i=1 ui(I). The egalitarian
welfare e(I) is equal to minni=1 ui(I).
Example 1 (Upper-triangular instance) Consider I with n agents, n items
and let each agent ai has utilities equal to 1 for items o1 to on−i+1. For a
deterministic mechanism that allocates all items to agents that like them, we
have that k(I) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, u(I) = n and e(I) ∈ {0, 1}. 2
Performance measures: We use the objectives in order to define three
statistics to measure the performance of online mechanisms over all instances.
(ES) min
I
k(I) (1)
(UW ) min
I
u(I) (2)
(EW ) min
I
e(I) (3)
Online ratios with advice: We say that an online mechanism M has an
offline (online) competitive ratio c(m) with m advice bits w.r.t. welfare W if,
for an instance I and an ordering o of m items, we have that W (OPToff(on)) ≤
c(m)·W (M(I))+b(m) holds where b(m) is an additive constant and OPToff(on)
is the optimal offline (online) mechanism. Note that the OPToff mechanism does
not depend on the ordering of the items whilst OPTon does. A mechanism M is
most c(m)-competitive w.r.t. welfare W if M has a competitive ratio c(m) w.r.t.
W and each other mechanism has a competitive ratio that is at least c(m). We
say that M1 is strictly better than M2 on a set of instances if the welfare value
of M1 is not lower than the one of M2 on all instances from the set, and greater
than the one of M2 on some instances from the set. We say that M1 and M2
are incomparable if M1 is strictly better than M2 on some instances and M2 is
strictly better than M1 on some other instances.
We suppose throughout the paper that agents sincerely report their utilities
for items. Also, we assume that each agent has positive utility for at least one
item and each item is liked by at least one agent. We show our results for the
case when m = n and there is a perfect allocation in I (or perfect matching in
GI), i.e. an allocation in which each agent receives exactly one item that they
like. However, we also draw conclusions for the case when m > n and there
is an allocation in which each agent receives at least one item that they like.
Finally, we extended all our results to the case when the maximum number of
agents that receive items that they like in each possible allocation is k < n (or
maximum matching in GI of cardinality k < n). However, we omit these results
for reasons of space.
3 Online Fair Division without Advice
We study the competitiveness of our four online mechanisms w.r.t. to the optimal
offline mechanism for the expected matching size (ES), the utilitarian welfare
(UW) and the egalitarian welfare (EW). The optimal offline mechanism returns
an allocation in which each agent receives exactly one item for (ES), an allocation
in which each item is received by an agent that values it most for (UW) and a
perfect allocation that maximizes the egalitarian welfare for (EW).
3.1 Expected Matching Size
A mechanism that maximizes the objective k(I) also maximizes both u(I) and
e(I) simultaneously when agents have simple binary utilities. By Theorem 2
from [17], no deterministic online mechanism can maximize (ES). We, therefore,
turn our attention to randomized mechanisms for (ES). By [13], the Rank-
ing mechanism is most competitive for (ES) with expected matching size of
n · (1− 1e ) + o(n) when the arriving sequence is adversarial. Its competitive ratio
is 1 + 1e−1 . For this reason, we next report the competitive ratios of Balanced
Like, Like and Maximum Like with respect to the optimal offline mechanism
and Ranking. The optimal offline mechanism returns a matching of expected
size n.
Theorem 1 The Like and Balanced Like mechanisms are 2-competitive and
2 · (1 − 1e )-online competitive whereas the Maximum Like mechanism is n-
competitive and n · (1− 1e )-online competitive for (ES).
Proof. For Balanced Like, consider the Random mechanism that allocates
each next item uniformly at random to an agent among those with 0 items.
If no such agent exists for the current item, then Random discards the item.
The Balanced Like mechanism can be seen as a completion of Random, i.e.
Balanced Like allocates even the items that Random discards. It is easy
to prove that the expected matching sizes of Balanced Like and Random
are the same for each instance. Therefore, the Balanced Like and Random
mechanisms achieve the same expected matching size for each instance. By [13],
the minimum such size is equal to n2 + o(log2 n).
For Like, consider n agents, n items. Suppose that each agent likes the first
n/2 items. The remaining n/2 items are chosen by the adversary. We have that
k ∈ [1, n/2] different agents are allocated the first n/2 items. The adversary then
chooses the next n/2 items in such a way so that n/2 different agents like them
and k of them are the ones matched the first n/2 items. The expected matching
size is n2 + o(log2 n). There could be instances, however, when this size is lower.
For Maximum Like, consider an instance with n agents and n items. Let
us suppose that all agents have positive utilities for all items but only agent a1
has the greatest utility for each item. The mechanism gives all items to agent
a1 and thus achieves a matching size of 1. Note that this is the worst possible
outcome. For each instance, the expected matching size of this mechanism is at
least 1 because it allocates all items to at least one agent. 2
Observation 1 The Ranking mechanism is strictly better than the Balanced
Like mechanism which is strictly better than the Like mechanism for (ES).
For Ranking and Balanced Like, the result in Observation 1 follows im-
mediately from Theorem 1. By Lemma 1, Balanced Like is at least as compet-
itive than Like for each instance. For some instances, Balanced Like is more
competitive than Like. Hence, Balanced Like is strictly better than Like.
Lemma 1 Let pij be an allocation of items o1 to oj, and ρj and σj extend pij
to all items by using Balanced Like and Like, respectively. Further, let b(ρj)
and l(σj) be their probabilities. For each instance, j ∈ [1, n] and pij, we have that∑
ρj
b(ρj) · k(ρj) ≥
∑
σj
l(σj) · k(σj) holds.
Ranking outperforms Maximum Like in general over all instances. In con-
trast, there are instances on which Maximum Like outperforms Ranking. We
illustrate this in Example 2.
Example 2 (Expected matching incomparabilities) Consider the fair di-
vision of 2 items between 2 agents. Let u11 = 2, u12 = 0, u21 = 1, u22 = 2. The
expected matching sizes of Maximum Like and Ranking are 2 and 3/2. 2
If m > n, our results hold as well. We conclude that Ranking is more
competitive than Balanced Like, Like and Maximum Like for (ES) in the
worst case.
3.2 Utilitarian Welfare
In general, the utilitarian welfare can be maximized even online with no informa-
tion about future items. One most competitive online mechanism that achieves
the optimal offline welfare is Maximum Like. Hence, the offline and online
competitive ratios of online mechanisms conflate to just one competitive ratio.
Proposition 1 With general utilities, the Maximum Like mechanism maxi-
mizes (UW).
Proof. Maximum Like allocates each next item in the ordering to an agent
with the greatest utility for the item. The returned online welfare value coincides
with the maximum possible offline value of this welfare, i.e. the maximum utility
sum over the items. 2
The result in Proposition 1 is straightforward in our setting but there are fair
division settings in which optimizing the utilitarian welfare is intractable even
offline when the entire problem input information is available [18]. We, therefore,
find our result fundamental. On the other hand, with binary utilities, note that
each mechanism that gives all items to agents that like them maximizes the
utilitarian welfare. Indeed, Balanced Like and Like do maximize it whereas
Ranking does not because it might discard items.
Observation 2 With 0/1 utilities, the Balanced Like and Like mechanisms
are strictly better than the Ranking mechanism for (UW).
With general utilities, Like is n-competitive; see the example in the proof
of Theorem 9 from [2]. By comparison, Ranking and Balanced Like are not
competitive from a utilitarian perspective even with just two agents and two
items. We illustrate these results in Example 3.
Example 3 (Utilitarian non-competitiveness) Consider the fair division of
2 items to 2 agents. Let u11 = 0, u12 = 1, u21 = 1, u22 = u. The optimal offline
utilitarian welfare is u+ 1 whereas the one of Balanced Like and Ranking
is 2. Their ratios go to ∞ as u goes to ∞. 2
Our Example 3 is in-line with an impossibility example and an impossibility
remark presented by [14] for online weighted bipartite matching. These show
that there is no deterministic or randomized online algorithm that maximizes
(or minimizes) the perfect utilitarian welfare (the sum of the utilities in a per-
fect allocation) where the competitive ratio of the algorithm depends only on
the number of agents n. In contrast, our utilitarian welfare objective (UW) is
different because its maximum value could be obtained by allocating all items to
a single agent. As a result, Maximum Like is a mechanism whose competitive
ratio does not depend even on n and Like is a mechanism whose competitive
ratio depends solely on n.
If m > n, the Maximum Like mechanism remains optimal for (UW). We
used the argument in the proof of Theorem 9 from [2] to construct an example
and show that Like remains n-competitive. Both Ranking and Balanced Li-
ke remain not competitive; see the example in the proof of Theorem 10 from
[2]. We conclude that Maximum Like is more competitive than Ranking, Ba-
lanced Like and Like for (UW) in any case.
3.3 Egalitarian Welfare
In this section, we optimize the egalitarian welfare. It is easy to see that there is
no deterministic online mechanism that maximizes the egalitarian welfare. We
focus therefore on randomized mechanisms.
With binary utilities, both Like and Balanced Like are n-competitive
from an egalitarian perspective; see Example 1. Moreover, Maximum Like is
equivalent to Like and hence it is also n-competitive. With general utilities, Ma-
ximum Like is unfortunately not competitive at all even with just two agents
and two items. See Example 4 for this simple result.
Example 4 (Egalitarian non-competitiveness) Consider the fair division
of 2 items to 2 agents. Let u11 = 2, u12 = 2, u21 = 1, u22 = 1. An optimal offline
egalitarian mechanism gives say item o1 to agent a1 with probability 1 and item
o2 to agent a2 with probability 1. Its egalitarian welfare is equal to 1. Maximum
Like gives items o1 and o2 to agent a1 with probability 1. Its welfare is equal to
0. Hence, its ratio is ∞. 2
Interestingly, with general utilities, Like, Balanced Like and Ranking
are all most n-competitive from an egalitarian perspective.
Theorem 2 With general utilities, the Balanced Like, Like and Ranking
mechanisms are most n-competitive for (EW).
Proof. The mechanisms have competitive ratios of n. Consider instance I,
agent ai and the first item oj in the ordering such that agent ai has positive
utility for it. We show that e(I) is at least 1n . With Like, we have that the
probability pi(j, I) of agent ai for item oj is equal to 1/nj where nj is the
number of agents that like item oj . Since nj ≤ n, we have pi(j, I) ≥ 1/n. With
Balanced Like and Ranking, the worst case for agent ai is when they have
been allocated 0 items prior round j and all agents together have positive utilities
for item oj . Therefore, we have pi(j, I) ≥ 1/nj ≥ 1/n. Hence, agent ai receives
expected utility of at least 1n . This lower bound is achieved in Example 1.
Next, we confirm that every other mechanism has competitive ratio at least
n. Consider the upper-triangular instance from Example 1 and a mechanism
M . If M shares the probability for the first item uniformly at random, then its
competitive ratio is equal to 1n . If M shares the probability for the first item not
uniformly at random, then its competitive ratio is lower than 1n . Suppose that
M gives the first item to agent an with probability p >
1
n . The probability of
some other agent must be smaller than 1n as these probability values sum up to
at most 1. WLOG, suppose that the probability q of agent a1 for this first item is
one such value smaller than 1n . The egalitarian welfare on the upper-triangular
instance is then p. However, consider next the lower-triangular instance, i.e.
agent ai likes items o1 to oi. The mechanism gives expected utility of q <
1
n to
agent a1. This value is also the welfare on the lower-triangular instance. M has
competitive ratio of 1/q because the optimal offline welfare is 1. 2
Observation 3 With 0/1 utilities, the Ranking mechanism is strictly better
than the Balanced Like mechanism which is strictly better than the Like
mechanism for (EW).
Observation 3 can be shown similarly as Observation 1. Surprisingly, there are
instances on which Maximum Like outperforms all the other three mechanisms
even though it is not competitive in general. See Example 5 for this result.
Example 5 (Egalitarian incomparabilities) Let I has 2 items, 2 agents and
u11 = 2, u12 = 1, u21 = 1, u22 = 2. The value of e(I) of Maximum Like is 2
whereas the value of e(I) of Balanced Like, Like or Ranking is equal to
3/2. 2
If m > n, Ranking and Balanced Like become not competitive; see the
example in the proof of Theorem 10 from [2]. Like however remains most n-
competitive; see the example in the proof of Theorem 9 from [2]. We conclude
that Like is more competitive than Ranking, Balanced Like, Maximum
Like for (EW) in the worst case.
4 Online Fair Division with Full Advice
We next study most competitive adviced mechanisms for the expected matching
size (ES), the utilitarian welfare (UW) and the egalitarian welfare (EW). By
Proposition 1, there is a deterministic online mechanism that maximizes (UW)
even without any advice. We, therefore, focus on (ES) and (EW).
We assume that the oracle specifies on the tape a different agent for each of
the n items. Such an encoding requires dlog2 n!e advice bits. By Theorem 1 from
[17], there is a deterministic online mechanism that uses dlog2 n!e advice bits and
maximizes (ES). By Theorem 2 from [17], no deterministic online mechanism
can use less than dlog2 n!e advice bits and maximize (ES). These two results
are inherited for (EW) as well. Interestingly, we next prove that no randomized
online mechanism can use less than dlog2 n!e advice bits and maximize either
objective (ES) or (EW).
Theorem 3 There is no randomized online algorithm that uses less than dlog2 n!e
advice bits and maximizes (ES). Even with 0/1 utilities, there is no randomized
online algorithm that uses less than dlog2 n!e advice bits and maximizes (EW).
Proof. For (ES), suppose that there is such a mechanism. The maximum
value of (ES) is n. Let pi be an allocation returned by the mechanism and p(pi)
its probability. Recall that k(pi) ≤ n denotes the number of different agents
that receive items in pi. If
∑
pi p(pi) < 1 holds, then we conclude that
∑
pi p(pi) ·
k(pi) < n holds. Therefore, the mechanism does not maximize (ES) which is a
contradiction. Consequently,
∑
pi p(pi) = 1 holds. But, now we have that
∑
pi p(pi)·
k(pi) < n iff k(pi) < n for some pi returned by the mechanism. Therefore, as the
mechanism maximizes (ES), we conclude that k(pi) = n for each pi. To sum up,
the mechanism returns only perfect allocations and their probabilities sum up
to 1. We can define now a deterministic online mechanism given one pi returned
by the randomized online mechanism. This deterministic online mechanism also
uses less than dlog2 n!e advice bits and maximizes (ES). This is in contradiction
with Theorem 2 from [17]. This result holds even with more items than agents.
For (EW) and binary utilities, suppose that there is such a mechanism. Hence,
each agent receives an expected utility of 1 and the probability of 1 for each
item is shared completely between agents that like the item. Given instance
I, consider the random assignment matrix P (I) = (pi(j, I))n×n of this mech-
anism. The matrix P (I) is bistochastic because ∑ni=1 pi(j, I) = 1 for each j
and
∑n
j=1 pi(j, I) = 1 for each i hold. By the famous result of Birkhoff, every
bistochastic matrix is a convex combination of permutation matrices [6]. Each
permutation matrix corresponds to a perfect allocation in I. There could be mul-
tiple combinations for the same bistochastic matrix. For each such combination,
we can define a randomized online algorithm that uses less than dlog2 n!e advice
bits and maximizes (ES). This is in contradiction with the previous result. This
result holds even with more items than agents. 2
5 Online Fair Division with Partial Advice
In this section, we report the reciprocal ratios of the mechanisms. We assume
that the oracle specifies agents for k < m items. We start with the case when
m = n. For (ES), the oracle specifies a different agent for each of the first k
items. An efficient encoding requires dlog2 k!e advice bits. If k = n−1, Adviced
Ranking and Adviced Balanced Like are optimal because they keep track
on the past allocation whereas Adviced Maximum Like and Adviced Like
have ratios 1− 1n and 1− 1n + 1n2 . If k < n− 1, we next report their ratios.
Theorem 4 With dlog2 k!e advice bits, Adviced Ranking is most (e−1)n+ken -
competitive for (ES).
Proof. The mechanism has two components: (1) one that allocates items
deterministically and (2) another one that allocates items according to Rank-
ing. Let the entire input graph be GI with n vertices in each partition. Let us
remove the k deterministically decided vertices from both partitions together
with their edges from GI . Now, consider the remaining bipartite sub-graph with
(n−k) vertices in each partition. This graph has perfect matching of size (n−k)
and Ranking matches vertices in this graph. Therefore, the expected matching
size of Ranking on this smaller graph is (n−k) · (1− 1e )+o(n−k). We conclude
that this size for Adviced Ranking is k + (n− k) · (1− 1e ) + o(n− k).
By Theorem 1 from [17], the deterministic component of Adviced Rank-
ing maximizes (ES) on the bipartite sub-graph of GI that contains the adviced
2 · k vertices. By [13], we conclude that the randomized component of Adviced
Ranking maximizes (ES) on the bipartite sub-graph of GI that contains the
remaining unadviced 2 · (n− k) vertices. 2
By Theorem 2 from [17] and our Theorem 3, there is no mechanism that uses
less than dlog2 k!e advice bits and has a greater competitive ratio than Adviced
Ranking with dlog2 k!e advice bits. We also obtained that the offline ratios of
Adviced Maximum Like, Adviced Balanced Like and Adviced Like for
(ES) and k ∈ [1, n − 1) are kn , k+n2n and at most k+n2n . Their online ratios are
ek
(e−1)n+k ,
e(k+n)
2(e−1)n+2k and at most
e(k+n)
2(e−1)n+2k . In Figure 1, we plot these ratios
for n = 10 agents and k ∈ [0, n] oracle calls.
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Fig. 1: (left) w.r.t optimal offline mechanism, (right) w.r.t. Adviced Ranking
For (UW), (EW) and 0/1 utilities, the oracle specifies a different agent for
each of the first k items. For (UW) and general utilities, the oracle specifies
an agent for each of k most valued items. The worst case for Adviced Rank-
ing and Adviced Balanced Like is when the adviced allocation biases the
allocation of future items towards agents who receive negligibly small utilities for
these items. Instead, Adviced Like allocates each such unadviced item to an
agent with probability at least 1n . Adviced Maximum Like optimizes (UW) by
Proposition 1. For (EW) and general utilities, the oracle computes an allocation
of k items to agents that maximizes the egalitarian welfare and then specifies the
k agents for the k items in this computed allocation. Adviced Ranking and
Adviced Balanced Like focus on agents with zero and fewest items whereas
Adviced Like and Adviced Maximum Like perform as Like and Maximum
Like.
We next consider the case when m > n. For (ES), we conclude the same
results as above. For (UW), (EW) and 0/1 utilities, we assume that the oracle
specifies k agents for the first k items in the ordering for which the k agents are
different. For (UW), (EW) and general utilities, the oracle specifications are as
in the case when m = n. We summarize all ratios in Table 1.
Table 1: Ratios for k ∈ [0,m) adviced items and l ∈ [1, n) adviced agents:
(b) - binary utilities, (g)-general utilities.
Mechanism
(UW)-b (UW)-g (EW)-b (EW)-g (EW)-g
m ≥ n m ≥ n m ≥ n m = n m > n
Adv.Max.Like 1 1 1
n
0 0
Adv.Bal.Like 1 k
m
1
n−l
1
n−l 0
Adv.Like 1 k
m
+ 1
n
− k
nm
1
n
1
n
1
n
Adv.Ranking ≤ n
m
k
m
1
n−l
1
n−l 0
6 Related Work and Conclusions
We combined competitive analysis, advice complexity and online fair division.
Our results are simple but fundamental to understand better the interface be-
tween matching and fair division problems. In conclusion, the chair might use
Adviced Ranking for (ES), Adviced Maximum Like for (UW) and Adviced
Like or Adviced Balanced Like for (EW). We quantify the offline and online
performance of these mechanisms with respect to the number of advice bits they
can read from an oracle tape. We also presented two impossibility results and
closed an open question from [17].
In future, we will analyse other b-matching mechanisms from a fair division
viewpoint [11,12]. Also, we can explore more objectives (e.g. the Nash welfare)
or competitive measures (e.g. price of anarchy) [2,9]. There are more general
matching models with weights attached to the “boy” vertices or “girl” vertices
arriving from a known distribution or a random order [16]. It would be interesting
to see if our mechanisms remain most competitive in such models.
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